SAIB CE-11-47R1
SUBJ: Goodyear Aviation Tires Landing Gear, Tire Tube. Goodyear Aviation Tires, Flight Mate Butyl Inner Tube, 7.00-8.00-6.
This Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) alerts operators, pilots, and aircraft manufacturers of possible inner tube failures made from butyl rubber by Goodyear Aviation Tires, (Goodyear). At this time, the failure of the inner tubes is not an unsafe condition that would warrant airworthiness directive (AD) action under Title 14 of the Code of Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR) part 39. The SAIB has been revised to incorporate updated information from Goodyear and highlight inner tube failures are not limited to only cold weather operations.
Background There have been several reports of Goodyear inner tubes failures during cold weather operations. The failures were reported following short flights or following ground operations. Goodyear is aware of these failures and has made several attempts to improve the cold weather performance of its inner tubes. In November 2008, Goodyear incorporated a change to its compound for their butyl rubber inner tubes. Since then, the reliability of the inner tubes had increased, but cold weather failures were still reported. Therefore, Goodyear has started to test another improvement to their butyl rubber inner tubes made from an updated compound. Following successful field testing, Goodyear will make the improved inner tubes available. Goodyear inner tube failures are not limited to only cold weather operations, additional failures have been reported. Goodyear is aware of the issues from the field and began an improvement program to investigate and improve the inner tubes. A flex crack was occasionally observed on the natural fold from the extrusion process during manufacturing. The compound was modified to reduce the impact of extrusion, optimize splicing pressure and improve flex which should improve crack resistance. Additionally cold temperature properties of the tube were improved to further enhance performance for cold temperature operations. Inner tubes were produced with the improved compound and field tested with positive results. As of August 15, 2011 the production has been changed over to the modified compound for 5.00-5 inner tubes.
SAIB CE-12-15
SUBJ: Cessna Aircraft Company DC Power Distribution System – Avionics Master Switch
This Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) informs registered owners and operators of an airworthiness concern associated with the avionics master switch on Cessna Aircraft Company (Cessna) Model 172R, 172S, 182T, T182T, 206H and T206H airplanes. There is a potential for an accelerated rate of failure of the switch, which may result in the loss of avionics equipment on Garmin G1000-equipped airplanes. Although failure of the switch can result in loss of equipment, these airplanes are designed such that avionics equipment necessary for the pilot to continue safe flight and landing are still maintained through the aircraft’s electrical system. At this time, this airworthiness concern is not considered an unsafe condition that would warrant an airworthiness directive (AD) action under Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR part 39).
Background We have received reports indicating a trend of failures associated with components of the Garmin G1000 avionics suite in the Cessna single-engine models identified above. After investigating further and coordinating with Cessna, we determined that electrical contact erosion was occurring internal to the switch. This erosion is due to power-up surge currents caused by avionics equipment connected to one side of the switch (Avionics Bus 2). We reviewed the electrical distribution system for the affected models and found that in the event of a complete failure of the avionics master switch, essential equipment necessary to continue safe flight and landing will be maintained through alternate power sources. Cessna has issued Service Bulletin SB 11-24-02 to address this issue.
SAIB CE-12-14
SUBJ: Cessna Aircraft Company Three Alternative Methods of Compliance for AD 2011-10-09
This Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) advises owners and operators of three alternative methods of compliance (AMOCs) for AD 2011-10-09. These AMOCs contain procedures that could (for your airplane) be more efficient and cost effective while providing an acceptable level of safety to AD 2011-10-09.
Background AD 2011-10-09 currently requires repetitive inspections of the seat track areas with replacement of damaged parts on Cessna 150, 152, 170, 172, 175, 177, 180, 182, 185, 188, 190, 195, 206, 207, 210, T303, 336, and 337 series airplanes. Since issuance of AD 2011-10-09, the type-certificate holder (Cessna Aircraft Company) has made available three AMOCs for those who must comply with AD 2011-10-09.
Briefly, these AMOCs can be described as:
Repair procedures for steel seat foot / roller housings for Cessna Series 150 and 152 airplanes;
Relief for some operators from the required 100 hour repetitive seat track inspections; and
Roller housing inspections for the various Cessna Models listed in AD 2011-10-09.
SAIB CE-12-13
SUBJ: Eclipse Aerospace, Inc. Ailerons
This Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) informs registered owners/operators of all Eclipse Aerospace, Inc. EA500 model series aircraft (under Type Certificate Data Sheet A00002AC) of an airworthiness concern. Specifically, this SAIB provides guidance for inspection of the aileron joints and replacement with redesigned parts.
At this time, this airworthiness concern has not been determined to be an unsafe condition that would warrant airworthiness directive (AD) action under Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 39.
Background The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) received reports of increased lateral stick force. Investigation determined that possible corrosion of the aileron joint assembly bearing or shaft resulted in aileron friction being out of tolerance. Eclipse Aerospace, Inc. has developed Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) 500-27-004, Revision B. This bulletin provides instructions for performing inspections within 50 flight hours, and thereafter at every 100 flight hour intervals. The bulletin also provides instructions for replacing certain parts in the aileron system. Replacement of the parts in accordance with the alert service bulletin terminates the need for the repeat inspections.
This SAIB is being issued because the FAA continues to receive service difficulty reports that indicate the issue is continuing to be found on aircraft and the agency wants to increase awareness and compliance with the Eclipse alert service bulletin.
SAIB SW-12-12
SUBJ: Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation Conducting Engine Failure Simulation in Helicopters with Reciprocating Engines.
The Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) advises you, owners and operators of Schweizer 269C and 269C-1 aircraft, that Schweizer has updated the instructions and warning in the approved Pilot Flight Manual (PFM) to avoid throttle chops to full idle, minimizing the possibility of engine stoppage.
Background The Windsor Locks Flight Standards District Office has found numerous National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) accident reports involving practice autorotations of rotorcraft with air-aspirated engines. Most of these accidents were caused by pilots conducting a rapid movement of the throttle, i.e. throttle chop, resulting in the shutdown of the air-aspirated engine. Another major factor in the accidents is that the autorotations were practiced where by a safe touchdown could not be accomplished with an unplanned engine shutdown as is required by the FAA’s “Flight Instructor Practical Test Standards for Rotorcraft, Helicopter, Gyroplane” (FAA-S-8081-7) and “Commercial Pilot Practical test Standards for Rotorcraft, Helicopter, Gyroplane” (FAA-S-8081-16). At this time, this airworthiness concern is not an unsafe condition that would warrant AD action under Title 14 of the Code of Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR) part 39.
SAIB NM-12-11
SUBJ: Boeing Company, The Equipment/Furnishings: Buffet/Galleys
This Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin advises registered owners and operators of The Boeing Company Model 737 airplanes equipped with B/E Aerospace G4B galleys of an airworthiness concern regarding possible latch failure on galley cabinets with ¼ turn latches installed with adhesive only fasteners.
Background During an accident investigation involving an airplane that departed the runway during takeoff, one of the aft galley drawers previously latched in its compartment for takeoff was found on the galley floor. Further examination revealed that the compartment latch plate had been affixed to the compartment by an adhesive fastener, with no mechanical connectors. Unrestrained items in this location are particularly hazardous because an aft facing flight attendant jumpseat is located directly forward of the galley. Adhesive only fasteners, such as the fastener used in this compartment, are susceptible to degradation over time because of exposure to temperature changes, sunlight, chemicals, and other factors. Consequently, the reliability of an adhesive fastener becomes uncertain as the airplane ages.
At this time, the airworthiness concern is not an unsafe condition that would warrant Airworthiness Directive (AD) action under Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) Part 39.
SAIB SW-12-10
SUBJ: Enstrom Helicopter Corporation, The Enstrom Helicopter Corporation 280FX Helicopters; Fuel Quantity Indicator
This Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) alerts owners and operators of Enstrom Helicopter Corporation-manufactured (Enstrom) 280 FX helicopters of a false fuel quantity indication with subsequent risk exposure to fuel exhaustion during flight. At this time, this airworthiness concern is not an unsafe condition that would warrant airworthiness directive (AD) action under Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 39.
Background There has been a report of a helicopter accident that occurred after fuel exhaustion. Investigation revealed a false “Full” fuel quantity indication on the fuel indicator as contributory. This false reading was due to the fuel level sending unit wires being disconnected. A false fuel quantity indication of “Full” results when the fuel level sending unit wires are disconnected at the “wristlock” located between the tops of the left and right fuel tanks, with the master switch in the “On” position.
SAIB CE-12-09
SUBJ: Diamond Aircraft Industries Inc Landing Gear, Nose: Diamond DA20 Nose Landing Fork Assembly
This Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin is issued to inform owners and maintainers of Diamond DA20 series aircraft of a potential unsafe condition regarding the cracking of the nose landing gear (NLG) fork assembly.
At this time, this airworthiness concern has not been determined to be an unsafe condition that would warrant airworthiness directive (AD) action under Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 39.
Background Cracks have been discovered on the NLG fork assembly, part number (P/N) 20-3220-08-00, during routine NLG inspections. The cracks appear just above the axle hole on the cut out flange. Transport Canada conducted a review of the service difficulty report database from 2005 to 2010 and found 10 reports concerning this issue.
In order to better detect cracking of the NLG fork assembly, Diamond Aircraft Industries has revised their DA20-A1 and DA20-C1 Aircraft Maintenance Manual Chapter 05-20-00, Scheduled Maintenance Checks. These changes require more frequent and more detailed inspections. Diamond offers a more robust fork assembly, P/N 20-3220-08-00_1, as a replacement for the original P/N 20-3220-08-00. The new part will be installed on new production models and supplied for future procurement orders.
Further detail on this product improvement is available from Diamond Service Information Letters SIL20A1-008 and SIL20C1-005 or by contacting Diamond Aircraft Industries Inc. at www.diamondaircraft.com.
